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I. INTRODUCTION
"Every command and every major office and
bureau of the Navy Department shall, on a
continuing basis, review its leadership
standards; each shall take effective measures
to improve them and shall develop an
awareness of the need for good leadership by
providing programs of instruction in
leadership principles and practices."
The above quotation is taken from Navy Department
General Order Number Twenty-one. This General order goes on
to specify that in accordance with article 0710 of Navy
Regulations, 1948, "the Commanding Officer shall encourage
and provide assistance and facilities to the personnel under
his command who seek to further their education in
professional and other subjects." In compliance with these
orders the Navy has become one of the largest educational
institutions in the world. From highly specialized schools
such as Basic Underwater Demolition to graduate schools
providing degrees in Nuclear Physics, the Navy has through
the years developed comprehensive training programs to
better prepare its people to do their jobs.
Since the establishment of the Navy's senior enlisted
grades, E-8 and E-9, there have been numerous studies,
surveys and investigative boards formed to determine the
most effective administration, utilization and training of
these groups. Despite these numerous attempts and after
almost twenty years of existence, the Navy is still debating
how these pay grades are to be best utilized and what




The objectives of this thesis are (1) to explore the
utilization of these enlisted pay grades, E-8 and E-9, both
as intended and in practice, (2) to identify what training
is needed for these groups, and (3) to analyze alternative
methods of providing this training. During this last phase
the primary objective will be to determine which alternative
would be the most cost effective given a recommended set of
measurement criteria.
The need for this thesis was prompted by the results of
the Chief of Naval Operations Master Chief Petty Officer
Advisory Panel of October 1976, which recommended in part
that the Navy should establish a Chief Petty Officer Academy
that would provide the Navy's enlisted middle managers the
requisite leadership skills required to properly manage and
avoid "crisis management" situations. [ 1 ] Although the
panel's recommendation limited its remarks to leadership
skills, exploratory discussions with personnel in the office
of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy have indicated
that the panel's envisioned CPO Academy would actually
address a wide range of training needs for Navy middle
managers. For purposes of this study the term "middle
manager" will apply only to enlisted pay grades E-8 and E-9;
the pay grade E-7 will be defined as the senior technician
within a rating.
E. METHODOLOGY
To accomplish the objectives of this thesis an in depth
historical research of the Navy's Master-Senior Chief Petty
Officer program was conducted from its inception to the
present. The reports of the numerous study groups convened
by the Chief of Naval Personnel provided the majority cf the
information concerning the utilization of these pay grades.

also included in this research was a look at the Navy's
original CPO Academy with its basic program, problems and
reasons for failure. A survey of current efforts was then
undertaken to determine the present status of the Navy's
senior petty officer training programs, the comparable
efforts of the other military services and lastly a sampling
of programs from civilian industries. The primary emphasis
in this phase of the study was to determine what it is that
Master-Senior chief petty officers, ie middle mangers, are
supposed to do and what type of training is needed to help
them do it better. Using the results and conclusions of
this research a basic training program was then developed
with specific criteria established by which alternative
methods of providing this training could te judged. An
economic, cost-effective analysis was then conducted to
determine now best to employ the Navy's scarce training
funds and resources to achieve its objectives. Inherent in
this analysis was the need to look at all the costs and
benefits of the alternatives, both those for which a dollar
value could be assigned and those which by their nature must
remain subjective. Lastly, based on the information
presented, conclusions are drawn and some recommendations
for future research are presented.
C. LIMITATIONS
Limitations have been imposed on this study by the
resources and time available. In particular, information
obtained was limited to that provided by various offices in
the Bureau of Naval Personnel and Chief of Naval Education
and Training, and to that available in the Naval Post
Graduate School library with its associated computer
research facilities. Due to the nature of the problem
investigated, relatively little written historical
information was uncovered and, therefore, primary research

efforts were dedicated to telephone interviews of other
Naval personnel involved in similar projects, to personal
correspondence with several West Coast colleges, and to
short field trips to the Army's Sergeants Major Academy and
local industry in the Monterey area. Cost data frcm the
civilian colleges was provided based on informal liaiscn and
should not be considered as a firm commitment for a Navy
program. Actual program cost data would require defining
specific courses to be provided as well as identifying the
specific institutions where the training would be
accomplished. Such effort was beyond the scope of this
study and until specific, formal Navy proposals are
presented to these institutions it would be impossible to
determine the exact costs involved. Recognizing these
limitations, the estimates provided present reasonable
approximations of the cost differences. Lastly, this study
was limited to investigation of the Navy's Master-Senior
Chief Petty Officer utilization and training and no attempt
was made to evaluate this program against the Warrant
Officer or Limited Duty Officer programs.
10

II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
The origin of the Navy*s Senior and Master Chief Petty
Officer roles can be traced back to May 20, 1958, when
President Eisenhower signed Public Law 65-422. This
legislation was a pay bill which authorized two new enlisted
grades, E-8 and E-9, for all military services. The need
for this law was initially recognized by the US Air Force.
The Air Force was at that time experiencing retention
problems with first term airmen due to the lack of promotion
opportunity. This lack of opportunity was caused ty the
Korean War build up of senior petty officers. [2] This
problem was further complicated by the fact that, since
1954, the Air Force had been using warrant officers to fill
many company grade officer billets. The intent of the Air
Force was to fill these billets with young college graduates
with greater growth potential. Public Law 85-422 resolved
the Air Force billet problems by creating vacancies in the
enlisted ranks thereby enhancing promotion opportunities.
The subsequent phasing out of the Air Force Warrant Officer
program also made billets available for young college
graduates. Another benefit Congress perceived from
establishing the new pay grades was that all the military
services would be able to retain the expertise of their
senior enlisted personnel by providing an improved career
pattern. [3] Although the law had established requirements
for minimum years of service and for limitations en the
number of personnel authorized per pay grade, it did not
address how these new pay grades were to be utilized. Each
service was, therefore, reguired to determine for themselves
how they would employ their new senior enlisted personnel.
Preliminary Navy guidance was provided prior tc the
above congressional action in Bupers Notice 5321 of May 2,
11

1958. This notice was intended to alert major commands of
the pending congressional action and to solicit their
recommendations for prospective E-8 and E-9 billets. As
specified in this notice, the new billets were to be
identified from within the then existing E-7 structure. The
billets selected, however, were to be those demanding
outstanding leadership, administrative, and technical
abilities. The notice further specified that the E-8 and
E-9 billets were to be equitably representative of all
ratings.
The general nature Df this notice created confusion
throughout the Navy in regard to what these new pay grades
were actually supposed to do. As a result, there was no
standardization between commands in identifying the E-8 and
E-9 billets. Additionally, because of the reguirement that
all ratings were to be equitably represented, many billets
were apparently identified simply to fill guotas and keep
the number of rating billets t.he same. Despite subsequent
attempts to rectify this situation, these problems persisted
and have continued to plague this program. The following
paragraphs are a brief summary of various study group
attempts to correct the problems inherent in this program.
A. STUDY GROUPS
Following the establishment of the additional pay grades
E-8 and E-9 in May 1958, the Chief of Naval Personnel
periodically convened special study groups to examine the
organization and administration of this program in
conjuction with the Warrant Officer and Limited Duty Officer
programs. In particular, these study groups were requested
to provide recommendations with regard to maximizing the
utilization of personnel assigned to these programs and to
eliminate any redundancy of responsibilities.
12

1 • !iiii£!§ Board
In May of 1959, the Hillaims Board was formed to
study the problems of the new S-8 - E-9 program and to
conduct an overall evaluation of the effectiveness of the
E-8 - E-9, Warrant Officer, and Limited Duty Officer
programs. During their review the board determined that the
majority of E-8 - E-9 billets were basically E-7 billets
with no major change in status or responsibility.
Additionally, the increased responsibility and technological
expertise desired of E-8 - E-9's overlapped with that
expected of Warrant Officers. Because of this problem and
the combined effects of the Limited Duty Officer Program,
the Warrant Officer program was determined to be no longer
needed.
Eased on the board's findings the major
recommendations submitted were : (1) to eliminate the
Warrant Officer program through attrition (the Air Force had
already opted for this procedure) ; (2) to redesignate the
warrant officer billets involved as either Limited Duty
Officer or Master-Senior Chief Petty Officer billets as
appropriate; (3) to require a minimum obligated service of
at least two years upon advancement to either E-8 or E-9;
and (4) to provide for coordinated detailing within the
Bureau of Personnel for all three programs. The study group
further suggested that the above recommendations should be
placed in effect without substantial change for a trial
period of five years. At the end of this trial period all
aspects of the program were to be reevaluated under the
conditions then existing. With the exception of providing
for coordinated detailing, all recommendations were accepted
and no new appointments to Warrant Officer were made during
the trial period.
2» Settle Board
In August 1963, the Settle Board was convened under
13

the direction of Vadm Thomas G. W. Settle, USN, Retired.
The board's purpose was to again study the utilization of
personnel assigned to the three programs and to review the
results of the Williams Board recommendations. Despite the
subsequent guidance of Bupers Instruction 1430.11 of June
1958, and the envisioned billet redesignaticns recommended
by the 1959 Williams Board, the Settle Board determined that
the majority of Master-Senior Chief Petty Officer billets
were still being assigned primarily to meet authorized
manning ceilings. The board's report stated that rather
than providing two higher enlisted pay grades with
commensurate responsibility and authority, the Navy in fact
was establishing two higher pay levels of chief petty
officers, E-7. The board also determined that because of
statutory limitations on their signature and accountability
authority, Master-Senior chief petty officers were legally
prohibited from assuming certain Warrant Officer billets.
This finding was actually in error but the misconception was
not corrected until November 1967.
In response to an inquiry from another study group
convened at that time, the Judge Advocate General of the
Navy stated that except for: (1) accounting for public
funds; (2) administering the oath of enlistment or
appointment; and (3) certifying documents for administrative
purposes, there were no statutory restrictions on the
assignment of Master-Senior Chief Petty Officers to ashore
or afloat billets. [4] However, based on their original
findings and the results of their review which supported the
need for warrant officers to fill the technology gap caused
by the increased sophistication of shipboard weapons
systems, the Settle Board recommended that the Warrant
Officer program be revitalized. To resolve the potential
conflict of billet assignments the board further recommended
that qualification requirements for Master-Senior Chief
Petty Officer be formulated based upon the beard's
recommended compressed rating structure. Master-Senior
14

Chief Petty Officer tillets could then be defined based on
actual needs for these qualifications rather than to just
fill authorized personnel ceilings.
As a result of this board's recommendations, the
Warrant Officer program was restarted and an attempt was
made to formally define the qualifications fcr Master-Senior
Chief Petty Officer.
The compressed rating structure was a key element of
this board's recommendations and it was based on the theory
that a man should be required to have additional knowledge
of other ratings as he goes up the rate-rank ladder. This
increased knowledge would permit him to supervise more
activities which would compliment the increased
responsibility and authority envisioned by the original
Supers instruction. This increased supervisory role,
however, was still defined as separate and subordinate to
that of the Warrant Officer or Limited Duty Officer.
The Settle Board recognized that failure to define
billets based on actual needs was the underlying cause of
the Navy's problem in using the new enlisted pay grades.
This last recommendation of defining billets based on actual
needs, however, met with only marginal success.
3« Crutchfield B eard
In June of 1967, the Crutchfield 3oard was convened.
Unlike the previous two boards, this board was directed to
limit the scope of its review to only the E-8 - E-9 program.
In particular it was to study the role and function of E-8 -
E-9 petty officers and the validity of the cencept of rating
compression as recommended by the Settle Board. It also was
to make a thorough review of all previous recommendations
and the adequacy of current instructions and notices. The
emphasis of this review was to determine the effectiveness
of this program in meeting the needs of the individual petty
officers as well as the needs of the Navy.
Based on the results of their review, which included
15

surveys of all Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers,
extensive field trips, and a detailed study cf all previous
correspondence, the board determined that the E-8 - E-9
program then in existence failed to meet either the needs of
the individual petty officers or the Navy. The members
determined that as of 1967 the Navy had still not officially
established meaningful billet requirements nor adequate role
and function definitions for E-8 - E-9's. As a result of
these failures, the petty officers involved perceived a loss
of recognition, prestige, and status which was adversely
affecting their mcrale and retention. The Navy, in turn,
was losing the services of this valuable group because of
their early transfer to the fleet reserve. The Navy was
also failing to effectively utilize their expertise while on
active duty.
The board also determined that as a result of the
self-cancelling provision of Bupers Notice 5321 cf 25
November 1958, the Navy had not had official guidance
concerning the utilization of Senior and Master Chief Petty
Officers since April 1959. Lastly, the tcard determined
that despite the intended goals of rating compression, this
program was in fact contributing to the adverse perceptions
of the E-8 - E-9's because the ratings compressed were not
sufficiently similar and the petty officers were, therefore,
not technically proficient in their new assignments. This
lack, of technical knowledge placed them in the embarrassing
position of not being able to perform to their superiors
expectations ncr properly supervise their subordinates.
To correct the problem of defining billet
requirements and role and function definitions, the board
proposed that two new categories of Master Chief Petty
Officer be established and that the Senior Chief Petty
Officer role be officially defined as the second highest
technical or specialty supervisor for each general rating.
The two categories of Master Chief Petty Officer would
include one as the senior enlisted technical supervisor and
16

the second as an entirely new rating which would be defined
as the enlisted assistant to the Commanding Officer or
Command Assistant. Billet requirements were then proposed
in terms of the above role and function definitions. The
board also submitted revised notices and instructions and
recommended that all rating compression be stopped.
Recognizing that the implementation of the prior two
groups 1 recommendations had been a major problem, the board
proposed that a single Bupers organization should be
assigned the responsibility for implementation of all the
recommendations. This organization would also be reguired
to report periodically to higher authority on their
progress. As an added check, the Inspector General's office
was also to monitor the utilization of the senior petty
officers during their routine inspections. Lastly, to
properly prepare the Master Chief Petty Officers for their
new duties, the board recommended that a formal school be
established to provide training in the areas of
administration, counseling, mamagement-supervision, and
communications.
Despite the efforts of this board and although many
of its recommendations were approved in concept, the
majority were never put into effect. No new role and
function definitions nor revised billet qualifications and
descriptions were ever published. The major successes of
the board were limited to: (1) publicizing the signature
authority of Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers; (2)
stopping rating compression based soley en technical
competence; and (3) although the new command assistant
rating for Master Chief Petty Officer was net approved, the
need for a billet such as Master Chief Petty Officer of the
Command was established. No reasons were discovered for the




4 . CPO Academy
Another program that received varying amounts of
attention during this same period of time (1959 to 1971) was
the Chief Petty Officer Academy at Pensacola, Florida. The
Chief Petty Officer Academy, or CPO Leadership School as it
was originally designated, was authorized ty the CNO on 25
February 1959, and became operational in April 1959. [5] It
was originally conceived as an integral part of an overall
Navy coordinated program to further leadership training in
compliance with General Order Twenty-one. The Academy was
operated under the direct cognizance of the Chief of Naval
Air Training (CNATRA) through the Commanding Officer, Naval
Aviation Schools Command. Its basic mission as stated in
CNATRA Instruction 1510. 7G cf November 1969, was,
"To inculcate in selected Chief Petty
Officers a more thorough awareness of their
responsibilities through instruction in
military matters, causes and effects of world
tensions, and the principles and techniques
of naval leadership."
The school's program consisted of five weeks of
training for E-7's and ibove. Classes convened eight times
a year with sixty students assigned per class for an annual
through-put cf four hundred and eighty students. Mandatory
quotas were assigned by CNATRA to each command. The
individual command was then responsible for funding all
temporary additional duty expenses including travel tc and
from the school. Commanding Officers were enjoined to use
their discretion in selecting only the best qualified
candidates and those demonstrating the greatest potential
for professional growth. The curriculum consisted of
approximately two hundred hours of academic instruction with
approximately fourteen percent of this time dedicated to
management training. The remaining portion was devoted to
drill and command, world affairs, Naval Traditions, Naval
18

Administration, and administrative time.
Throughout its twelve-year history, the concept of the
CPO Academy was highly praised and the school was reported
to be an unqualified success. However in 1971, while
consideration was being given to establishing a second CPO
Academy, this one on the west coast, the Chief of Naval
Training reevaluated the existing academy. Based on the
results of this study it was determined that continuation of
the CPO Academy in its present form was not justified. This
recommendation was based on what was described as "inherent
problems" which plagued the school. Problems mentioned in
the report were the use of the mandatory quota system, the
questionable and inconsistant selection criteria between
commands, and the curriculum emphasis on personal appearance
and physical fitness. Additionally, there were complaints
received from various commands regarding the disruptive
nature of the five weeks of temporary additional duty on
their operational readiness and the fiscal constraints
imposed upon them by the requirement to fund the per diem
and travel. The report went on to state that the value of
the additional indoctrination and leadership-management
training for chief petty officers was not questioned but in
view of the above problems the school should be closed and
no additional academy should be started.
It is interesting to note, however, that except fcr the
reference to curriculum emphasis, the majority of problems
mentioned related to the administration of the program.
Recent researcher interviews with several Naval personnel
who were familiar with the original CPO Academy
substantiated the curriculum problem and stated in general
their perception was that the academy had eroded to a "Boot
Camp for Chiefs". The remaining problems, however, were
external to the school organization and apparently would
have persisted regardless of the quality of instruction.
19

5 • Freeman B oard
With the end of the Vietnam conflict and an
increased interest in Human Resources management, the Chief
of Naval Personnel in 1973, convened a new study group, the
Freeman Board. The task of the board was to conduct a
thorough examination of the entire enlisted rating
structure. Special emphasis was to be directed at the Navy
Enlisted Occupational Classification System (NEOCS) to
determine the adequacy of this system to accurately identify
the skills needed by the Navy over the next two decades.
Recommendations were solicited from the tcard concerning
which ratings required expansion, compression, deletion or
redefining. The board was also to determine the
appropriateness of the nine enlisted pay grades with the
possibility of revising the structure to recognize
technical-professional advancement without necessarily
requiring a concomitant military advancement at each step.
During their review the board noted that the Navy
Enlisted Occupational Classification System had not been
reviewed nor updated since 1957 and that manpower and
personnel management problems had arisen in the intervening
years. In agreement with the Settle Board findings, the
Freeman Board identified the introduction of sophisticated
weapons systems as the main cause of the manpower problems
which, in turn, placed demands on the enlisted rating
structure for specialized skills that it was ill-equipped to
handle.
The board determined that, with respect to the E-8 -
E-9 , s, there continued to be problems with the overlap and
duplication in duties and responsibilities between senior
enlisted, Warrant Officers and Limited Duty Officers. In
particular, the board noted the lack of consistency in
defining E-8 - E-9 billets, the lack of sufficient E-8 - E-9
billets to provide a challenging career beyond twenty years
of service, and lastly, the tendency to favor Warrant
20

Officers in "skill oriented" managerial positions. As a
result of these problems the board reported that there was
an apparent loss in prestige and status by the Navy's Senior
and Master Chief Petty Officers which was adversely
affecting their morale and retention.
To correct these problems the beard recommended
utilizing Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers in
managerial capacities and eliminating a portion cf the
Warrant Officer structure for this purpose. It was believed
that assigning Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers as
managers would eliminate the previous problems of rating
compression and allow for meaningful, challenging billets
beyond the twenty year service point. The combined effect
cf this procedure would also provide for increased status
and prestige to the Senior and Master Chief Petty Officer.
Many of the Freeman Board recommendations were
implemented cr are on-going at this time. However, due to
the strong lobbying efforts of the Warrant Officer
community, no attempt was made to redesignate any existing
billets to Senior and Master Chief Petty Officer. Revised
gualification and Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) manuals
were published but continued to describe the Senior and
Master Chief Petty Officer only in terms of their rating or
technical speciality.
E. CURRENT EFFORTS
Despite the progress that was made since the Freeman
Beard in the areas of personnel administration and
management, the Navy has continued to be plagued with
problems regarding the effective utilization of its Senior
and Master Chief Petty Officers. From the preceeding
paragraphs it appears the basic problems have not changed.
Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers still desire
meaningful, challenging billets with increased authority and
21

responsibility. The leadership of the Navy desires to
utilize the skills cf its personnel in the most effective
manner to fulfill the needs of the individual and accomplish
the mission of the Navy. To accomplisn these objectives a
clear differentiation was needed between the senior enlisted
rates.
Some progress was made in December 1974, when the role
and function statements for Warrant Officer and Limited Duty
Officer were approved by the Secretary of the Navy. (See
Appendix A) Subsequent attempts at clarification fcr all
grades of Chief Petty Officer were not as successful.
Although Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers were defined
in the Advancement Manual as specialty supervisors and
administrators, meaningful billets different from these
traditionally assigned to E-T's have not been provided.
In late 1975, another Ad Hoc Committee was formed to
look into the CPO overlap problem but this cemmittee did not
produce any tangible results. A staff section of the Sureau
of Naval Personnel, Pers 23, was then tasked by the Chief of
Naval Personnel to evolve a larger role and greater prestige
for the Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers by recasting
their occupational standards.
Pers 23 efforts to date have been tied closely tc the
Navy's Occupational Task Analysis Program (NOTAP) . Using
the results cf the NOTAP studies, Pers 23 has developed new
role and function definitions for all three grades of Chief
Petty Officer. (See Appendix B) Their definitions are
grounded in the recommendations of prior beards that Senior
and Master Chief Petty Officers should be principally
utilized as managers. Using this concept of E-8 and E-9's
as managers, occupational standards for Chief Petty Officers
and occupational scopes for Senior and Master Chief Petty
Officers have been developed. The difference between the
two definitions lie in the requirement that to fulfill an
occupational standard a person must be technically
proficient in all lower rates. An occupational scope.
22

however, emphasizes management skills in which a person
should be knowledgeable but not necessarily technically
proficient in all skills of the lower ratings he supervises.
Using this definitional difference Pers 23 has reclassified
the approximately seventy technical ratings into twenty-four
occupational fields. It is believed that this
reclassification effort will provide a natural progression
from senior in-rating technician to manager within the chief
petty officer structure. This progression, in turn, should
provide the larger role and greater prestige the Senior and
Master Chief Petty Officers desire. However, as the Pers 23
study points out, defining a man as a manager and ensuring
he has the necessary background to perform as one are not
exactly the same thing. This same thought was expressed
earlier in a message from Commander Naval Air Forces,
Pacific, promulgated in November 1974, which stated,
"In order to effectively manage men and
material, to deal with the mindset of
incoming personnel and to achieve the
mission, leadership-management training is
necessary. A need exists for this training
at a priority level equal to technical
training."
More recently the recommendation from the Chief of Naval
Operations Master Chief Petty Officer Advisory Panel of
October 1976, indicated that Senior and Master Chief Petty
Officers have also percieved a need to improve their
managerial capabilities to properly meet the challenge of
the new Navy. [ 6
]
1 . Leadersh ip- Management Educati on and Training iLMETJ_
Responding to fleet demands for tetter
leadership-management training of the Navy's middle
managers, the Chief of Naval Operations tasked the Chief of
Naval Education (CNET) in January 1975 to conduct an inquiry
into Navy leadership training needs. [7] This tasking
proved to be the genesis of a massive Navy project which
23

lead to the development of a comprehensive, systematic
training program under the title of Leadership and
Management Education and Training (LMET) . The purpose of
this program is to eventually replace the 157
leadership-management courses and training programs that now
independently exist throughout the Navy with a coordinated
training plan under one central program sponsorship. [8] It
is envisioned that this new approach will eliminate much of
the redundancy between programs and make more efficient use
of Navy training resources.
One of the essential elements of this new program is
the identification of the leadership and management skills
which are indicative of superior performance. To determine
what these skills are, the McBer and Company Consulting Firm
was contracted by the Bureau of Naval Personnel to conduct
interviews of over 200 officer and enlisted leaders frcm the
Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and in the Washington, D. C.
area. Each interviewee was previously identified as a
superior or average performer by his supervisor. During the
interview each person was asked to describe critical
leadership incidents in which they had participated. The
responses to these interviews were then recorded and
analyzed using a job competency assessment technigue
developed by Harvard University Professor David C.
McClelland (1976). [9]
Based on this analysis twenty-eight discrete
competency characteristics were identified. [10] These
characteristics were later broken down into six universal
skills which were determined to be common to superior
performance at all levels in the chain of command.
Subseguent performance classification tests conducted by
McBer and Company using these universal skills demonstrated
that these factors could distinguish superior from average
performance at a highly significant level (H=.93, p<.001).
[11] The universal skills identified in the LMET program
are: (1) effective listening and counseling; (2) management
24

control; (3) probelm solving influence versus authoritarian
control; (4) proactive technical achievement behavior; (5)
goal setting and delegation; and (6) calm, flexible conflict
resolution.
The second major element of the LMET program is the
determination that with the recent advances in testing
techniques it is possible to objectively measure a person's
competence in each of the universal skill areas. By using
the results of these tests the Navy can tailor its
leadership-management training to concentrate on those areas
needing improvement. The Navy will also be able to measure
the success of its training efforts by giving prior and post
training tests.
The last major element of this program is the
identification of the key billets in the officer and
enlisted communities at which approximately eighty hours of
leadership-management training would be provided. This
training is designed to be given prior to the first
assignment to each identified key billet and would be
specially tailored to the particular leadership level being
assumed. The enlisted key billets as defined in the LMET
program are: recruit; petty officer; leading petty officer;
leading chief petty officer; and Master Chief Petty Officer.
It is not envisioned that separate training programs
would be required at each level. Rather, LMET courses will
be incorporated into existing programs at the various levels
such as during boot camp for recruits or during "A" schools
for petty officers. Using this procedure, existing
leadership courses will be systematically phased out and the
resources presently employed to support these courses will
be transferred to LMET courses. The principal advantage of
the LMET program, as mentioned earlier, is that the new
training provided at each level will be sequenced and
supportive of training received at all other levels.
Additionally, the entire training program will be
coordinated ty one central program sponsor.
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2- A.E1I Monograph Series
At approximately the same time (1975) as the Navy
was beginning its study and development of the LMET program,
a similar but independent effort was begun by the OS Army.
This recent Army study is the eighth in a series of
Leadership Monograph Studies which were designed to study
methods of improving the Army's leadership ability. The
purpose of monograph #8 was to determine what it is that
superior leaders do that makes them superior. However, in
contrast to the Navy study which relied upcn interviews to
identify competency characteristics of superior leaders, the
Army study employed an extensive review of behavioral
research, management literature, and a survey of prominent
industrial executive development programs. [12] Despite the
different approaches used by these independent groups, the
leadership skills identified and the conclusions drawn in
their reports are quite similar and appear tc be
corroborative.
To begin with, both studies recognized that
leadership development is not a one-time event but rather a
successive, long-term process. This process must build on
both previous training and prior experience. The theory of
progressive development also recognizes the appropriateness
of a given behavior at a given level by taking into
consideration the interrelatedness of position, role,
function and behavior. [13]
Secondly, to ensure a person is properly prepared to
assume a leaders hip- management position, the Army research
recommends that the training should be tailored to the level
being assumed and given prior to advancing to that position.
This same philosophy is recommended in the Navy's LMET
program.
Lastly, both studies reported that separate
leadership-management skills could be identified. Mora
importantly, the studies also stated that a person's
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competence in these skills could be tested and if needed,
improved through training. The only noted difference
between the two reports was in the number of
leadership-management skills identified. The Army report
addressed nine skills and the Navy six. The Army skills
are: communication; human relations; counseling;
supervision; technical; management science; desision making;
planning; and ethics. [14] However, the Army report went on
to state tnat the specific number of skills is not important
as long as the skills identified encompass all
organizationally relevant leadership behaviors. [ 15 ] A
comparison of the skills identified in the two reports
supports this conclusion.
3. HRM Survey
An inguiry into the responses of approximately nine
thousand First Class Petty Officers in the Navy Human
Resourses Management (HRM) Survey data bank (Bupers 5314-5),
further substantiates the general perception that the Navy's
middle managers are not performing as well as they could.
The information presented in this data bank was
collected from one hundred and sixty commands throughout the
Navy during the period of January 1976 to March 1977 as part
of a regularly scheduled organization development program
called a Human Resource Management Cycle. The HRM survey is
conducted through the use of a guestionnaire which can be
computer processed to provide a summary of the answers in
statistical form. The purpose of this survey is to provide
information to the Navy's leaders on areas requiring more
organizational effectiveness or corrective action. In
addition to the generally expected areas of equal
opportunity, race relations, motivation and morale, and drug
and alcohol abuse, this survey also looks at leadership,
training and utilization of people, and good order and
discipline.
For purposes of this thesis, thirteen survey
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questions relating to the dimensions cf supervisory
leadership and leadership training were selected frcm the
questionaire. The responses to these questions were then
analyzed to assess the perceived leadership performance of
Chief Petty Officers as seen by their immediate subordinate
First Class Petty Officers. One question was also used to
determine if adequate leadership training is presently being
provided at the local command level. Although the survey
did not breakdown the category of supervisor by pay grade,
it has been assumed that First Class Petty Officers see all
their chiefs as being basically the same. This assumption
seems reasonable when it is noted that the same billet at
different commands is frequently filled by Chief Petty
Officers cf different grades. [16]
Due to the extremely large sample size in this
survey, the results provided are statistically significant
(p=.99 sd=.006) and inferences can be drawn about the
entire population from this sampling . Responses of a 3 or
lower on a maximum scale of 5 were considered to be
indicators of unsatisfactory performance and areas for
concern to Navy leaders. The percentage of responses
falling into this category from the supervisory leadership
questions ranged from 24.6 to 53.6 per cent. Additionally,
63.2 per cent of those sampled felt they were not being
adequately trained in leadership skills by their local
commands. These figures support the need for improved
leadership performance of the Navy's middle managers and
also indicate that sufficient leadership training is not
presently being provided by the local commands. The results
of this statistical analysis of selected portions cf the
Human Resourses Management Survey data bank are found in
Appendix C.
4 . Survey of Civilia n Industries
To provide a test comparison of the military middle
management situation with that of the civilian sector a
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sample survey of three civilian companies in the local
Monterey area was conducted. The purpose of this survey was
to determine if civilian industry was facing similar middle
manager, leadership problems and if so, to determine what
corrective action they were taking. The companies contacted
were: Firestone Tire and Rubber Company; Schilling Division,
McCormick and Company, Incorporated; and Smuckers Conpany.
Interviews with the director of the Personnel and Training
Departments of each company were held and the above issues
were discussed.
Although no specific problems were identified, each
company reported general problems in the areas of plant
productivity, high worker absenteeism, and high personnel
turnover. All of these problems were partially attributed
to leadership weaknesses in their middle managers and
partially to the quality of the personnel hired. Because of
their clear differentiation between upper management and
front-line supervisors, none of these problems were felt to
be the result of an overlap of authority or responsibility
at the middle management level. All three companies did
report, however, that during their research they discovered
that in the divisions in which there appeared to be a good
working relationship between the supervisor and the workers,
they had less of the above described problems. Based on
this general perception and their desire to reduce these
types of problems, each plant had developed some form of
middle manager training program.
Of the three companies surveyed, only Firestone had
a formal, company-wide training program. However, the
essential elements of all three companies* training programs
were basically the same. Each consisted of in-house
seminars, lectures by the American Management Association
(AMA) , and extensive use of night classes offered by local
colleges
.
In contrast to upper management personnel which are
typically college graduates recruited from outside the
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company, front-line supervisors are generally selected from
within the blue collar work force. Tc qualify for
consideration for a supervisory position, a worker is
required to formally submit his request through his
supervisor. Based on an upper management review cf his
supervisor's recommendation, his past wcrk record, and his
absenteeism record, he is then interviewed by the director
of the personnel department. If his request is approved he
is then enrolled in the company's in-house middle manager
development program. He is also advised cf the various
courses availanle which are recommended to improve his
managerial ability and are offered at the local college
night school. This procedure obviously places most cf the
responsibility for advancement on the individual.
If a worker attends night school and a passing grade
of "c" or higher is earned, the company will refund 75 per
cent of the cost. Satisfactory completion of this program
still does not guarantee a worker a supervisory position but
it does improve his chances for selection.
Further researcher discussions with the training
directors of the three companies revealed that because of
their practice of selecting supervisors from within the
existing work force, no additional technical training was
required in their management training programs. Technical
training was generally limited to special company schools or
to on-the-job training. By the time a man was selected for
a supervisory position he had normally been with the company
for several years and had usually received all the technical
training he would need as a manager. The purpose of the
management training programs as stated by Mr. Rob Colyn of
Firestone Company was therefore, "to provide the supervisor
the skills needed to efficiently, manage his len and material
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to achieve the company's goals." A sampling of the types of
courses recommended by these companies are: effective speaking;
problem solving and decision making; counseling; leadership;





Before considering what programs are available for
providing leadership-management training and which one might
be the most cost effective, several assumptions need to be
established to provide a structure within which the
alternatives will be compared. To begin with, it will be
assumed that any of the potential alternatives, given
sufficient time, funding, and management and individual
effort, could produce qualified middle managers. The term
"qualified" will be defined by the academic standard of
satisfactorily completing the program.
Secondly, individuals selected to participate in this
training *ould be assumed to possess sufficient capability
and dedication to improve their ability to perform as middle
managers. Standardized selection criteria could be
controlled by the Bureau of Naval Personnel.
Thirdly, in keeping with the Pers 23 proposed rating
descriptions in which E-7 * s are identified as the senior
in-rate technician and E-8 - E-9's as managers-supervisors,
only E-8's and E-8 selectees would be eligible to
participate in any of the programs. However, as an interim
measure to provide this late career training to personnel
presently serving as Master Chief Perry Officers, a certain
percentage of the initial classes should be alloted to
E-9's. The percentage and the number of classes affected
could be determined by the Bureau of Naval Personnel.
Fourth, since it is possible to acquire a similar
education without attending a formal Navy program,
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completion cf any one of the alternatives will not be a
prerequisite for further advancement.. This guideline,
however, should not preclude the granting of an increased
promotion multiple for successful completion of any of the
alternative programs.
Lastly, in keeping with current Navy practice and
policy, a standard service obligation for a specified period




The above assumptions have established the baselice on
which to consider potential alternatives. The following
paragraphs define the criteria against which the
alternatives will be evaluated. The criteria have been
grouped into two categories. The first category identifies
the criteria considered absolutely essential for any
potential program. The second category identifies
nice-to-have characteristics in a program. (Although
valuable, these nice-to-have characteristics are not
considered absolutely essential for a program to exist.)
Essential
1. Management Skills - the program must provide the
management skills necessary to improve the managerial
performance of the Navy's middle managers.
2. Effectiveness - graduates of the program should
increase the efficient use of the Navy's resources and
improve the over-all effectiveness of the Navy in
accomplishing its objectives.
3. Student Loading - to achieve a goal of training
approximately ten per cent of the Navy's E-8's
annually, the program should have an eventual capacity
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of 800-850 students per year. However, for purposes of
a pilot program, a capacity of 400 students per year
should provide sufficient information on which tc make
an evaluation.
4. Lost Time - Navy personnel receive their salaries
whether they are working and providing a service or in
school studying. Therefore, to minimize the costs for
which no service is provided, the training program
selected should minimize this "lost time" to the Navy.
5. Management Control - to enable the Navy to exert direct
control over the training, the program must be easily
standardized yet responsive to designed changes.
Nice-To-Have
6. Retention - the program should have a positive effect
on the Senior Chief Petty Officer's desire to remain on
active duty.
7. Pride and Self Esteem - the student should "feel" a
sense of pride in his selection tc and graduation from
the program. This "feeling" should enhance his
self-esteem and have a positive effect on his
allegiance to the Navy.
8. Accredited - to ensure the quality of the education
provided, both real and as perceived ty the students,
the program should be accredited by rhe governing
Association of Schools and Colleges.
9. Supervision - to maximize the education provided, the
student to instructor ratio should be relatively small
(12-15: 1) .
10. Orientation - although the courses should be grounded
in academic disciplines, they should emphasize Navy
applications through appropriate examples.
34

11. Immediate Return on Investment (ROI) - tc provide the
quickest results to the Navy, the duration cf the
program should be as short as possible.
12. Navy Topics - to enhance the students knowledge cf the
Navy, the program should include special Navy courses
(ie . Navy Organization and Administration, Navy Supply
System, the Navy's role in foreign policy, etc.).
C. ALTERNATIVES
Alternatives investigated for providing
leadership-management training to Senior Chief Petty
Officers are listed below. Not every alternative
investigated proved to be feasible and, therefore, some are
listed only to indicate areas considered during this thesis
research. The alternatives are:
1. Creation of a Navy Senior Chief Petty Officer Academy
2. Use of other services' Non-commissioned Officer
Academies
3. Use of civilian colleges on a full-time basis
4. Ose of the College Extension Program
5. Use of Correspondence Courses
A brief description of each alternative program is
provided in the following paragraphs. Where appropriate,
cost data are displayed on a cost per student or cost per
student per week basis.
1 • !§ vy SCPO Academ y
As a result of recommendations from both the
CINCPACFLT-CINCLANTFLT Retention Conferences in 1975, and
the CNO MCPO Advisory Panel of October 1976, the Chief of
Naval Operations directed the Chief of Naval Educaticn and
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Training (CNET) to investigate possible sites and to provide
cost plannirg estimates for a Navy CPO Academy. In an
effort to keep start-up costs to a minimum, rennovatior and
conversion of existing facilities was determined by th€ CNET
staff to b€ the most economical approach. (This approach
has already been proven feasible by both the Army and Air
Force NCO Academies.) The conversion of an old hospital at
NAS Pensacola (bldg. 628) , for an estimated cost cf 2.7
million dollars has been recommended as the best available
site. [18] This building has the capacity to provide both
berthing and training space under one roof. The conversion
also has the added benefit of providing a useful new life to
a permanent Navy facility. Selection of this building was
based on a planned annual throughput of 400 students per
year. Classes would meet four times a year with one hundred
students per class. This number of students appears
satisfactory for an initial pilot program and should provide
sufficient information for an accurate assessment cf the
value of the school. This school could eventually graduate
approximately 800-850 students a year. This larger number
represents approximately 10 percent of the Navy's E-8
strength and would supplement the average annual attrition
from the E-8 - E-9 ranks. This number also coincides with
the annual shore to sea rotation figures fcr Senior Chief
Petty Officers. [ 19 ]
To overcome some of the problems that plagued the
original CPO Academy, it is recommended that SCPO's be
ordered through the school enroute to their next at-sea
duty. This procedure would eliminate the former, disruptive
practice of sending a man to school in a Temporary
Additional Duty (TAD) status. Additionally, training costs
should be funded by the Bureau of Naval Personnel as part of
the permanent change of station (PCS) orders. This
procedure would alleviate another problem cf the first CPO
Academy.
Eecause this school would provide valuable training
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for all future assignments at the Senior-Master CPO level,
it is recommended that a percentage of the initial classes
be made available to E-9 s . The exact number could be
determined by Bupers. Follow on classes should be
restricted to E-8's and E-8 selectees. This selection
criteria would be in keeping with the proposed distinction
between E-7»s as technicians and E-8 - E-9's as managers.
It is further recommended that formal rominatior and
selection procedures be established. Various commands could
submit the names of those personnel who gualify and are
recommended for consideration to attend the school. a
formal toard could then be convened by the Chief of Naval
Personnel to make the final selection. Standard selection
procedures, similar to those used to select officers to
attend the Naval Postgraduate School, or War College, would
ensure consistency and the highest quality input. It would
also serve to highlight the intent of the program to train
only those who have demonstrated outstanding potential to
assume positions of greater responsibility.
To support the purpose of the school and to provide
the quality education needed by the Navy's middle managers,
a challenging, demanding curriculum should be taught that
will both tax the student's capabilities and expand his
intellectual capacity. Although it is not intended that a
final degree be presented, the curriculum should be
accredited by the governing association of schools and
colleges. Eased on a review of existing courses,
suggestions from deans of civilian colleges, and discussions
with personnel in the Navy training commands, a course of
approximately ten (10) weeks would be required to provide
the education desired. The proposed curriculum should cover
the following areas: Human Relations; Counseling;
Supervision; Management Science; Decision Making; Planning;
Ethics; Communications; World Studies with special emphasis
on National Defense and the Navy's role in foreign policy;
and lastly, special Navy related subjects en administration
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and organization. It also is strongly recommended that the
curriculum be coordinated with the training provided ty the
Navy's LMET program and in fact be considered as the
capstone to this training effort. This philosophy is
already practiced in the other services and it is noted that
the Navy is the only service to date that dees not provide a
late-career training opportunity. It has been estimated
that to develop the above curriculum would take
approximately one year and 1.5 million dollars. [20]
In keeping with the image of the school as an
academic institution for middle managers, it is recommended
no formal athletic program or requirements be established
during school hours. It is hoped that those personnel who
would be selected to attend the school would already possess
the personal drive to keep themselves physically fit on
their own time.
To further attest to the credibility of the school,
it is recommended that a mixed faculty of military and
civilian instructors be used. Acquiring the knowledge to
properly teach certain subjects can only be accomplished
through years of academic study at the undergraduate and
graduate levels. Other subjects require years of practical
experience before a thorough understanding can be achieved.
To complement the variety of subjects to be taught, yet to
ensure the curriculum is sufficiently tailored to Navy
needs, both types of personnel are desirable. The Air Fcrce
Senior NCO Academy is presently using this approach and the
Commandant of this school has suggested that it is superior
to a one-sided faculty.
Lastly, it is recommended that a one year obligation
be required upon graduation from this academy. This
requirement would be in excess of current Navy directives
governing service requirements following formal training,
but it is in keeping with the standard practice of the other
services for this type of program. It also would ensure at
least a minimum payback for the Navy's investment.
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Based on currant cost estimates provided to the CNO
by the Chief of Naval Education and Training, the ccst of





US NAVY SCPO ACADEMY
(course length 10 weeks)
PRO RATA COST/STUDENT
DIRECT COSTS
1. Curriculum development $1.5 million,
amortized over 5 years and 400
students/year 750 l
2. MILCON for bldg. conversion $2,712
million, amortized over 5 years and ?
400 students/year l»36l
3. Student pay and allowances (10 ->
weeks) 4,376-;
4. Student travel (one way). Travel
from the academy is relevant to
the next command
Coast to Coast 200
One Coast 100 j.
Average 150 150
5. Per diem $2.00/day x 75 days 150
6. Civilian instructor pay
5 instructors x $20,000/year * $100,000
amortized over 400 students/year 2 50
7. & WN $460,000 amortized over 2400 students/year 1.160
SUBTOTAL $8.187
INDIRECT COSTS
1. Base support unknown - estimated to be










1. Curriculum development costs estimated by the Naval
Education Training Program Development Center (NETPDC)
,
22 April 1977.
2. MILCON and & MN estimated by Chief Naval Education
and Training (CNET) as reported to CNO, 27 April 1977.
3. Student pay based on B - K Dynamics, Inc., Billet Cost
Users Manuel , p. D-l, prepared for the Bureau of Naval
Personnel, Pers 212, November, 1976. Values presented
represent the full life-cycle cost of an average E-8
for 10 weeks.
4-. Student travel and per diem costs based on Standard Costs
obtained from, Travel Regulations Manuel, volume I .
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2 • 0§s of ot her servi ces 1 NCO Aca dem ies
The following paragraphs provide a brief description
cf the programs and training costs of the ether services'
NCO academies.
a. US Army Sergeants Major Academy
The Army's Sergeants Major Academy is located on
the grounds of an active Army base outside El Paso, Texas
called Fort Bliss. The school became operational in January
1973 and presently has a student enrollment cf two hundred
students, sixteen of whom are Navy Senior Petty Officers
(E-8 - E-9) . Within the physical constraints of existing
school facilities and family housing units, the school could
expand to a total enrollment of two hundred and forty
students. The school graduates two classes a year with each
class completing twenty-two weeks of instruction. The
academy is accredited by the Southern Association of
Colleges and Schools and awards 18 semester hours of ccllege
credit. The Army NCO Academy also provides an additional
six hours of college credit through a joint program with the
El Paso Community College. All instructors at the academy
are Army personnel. The academic day consists of six hours
of classroom instruction (12-14 students per class) which
emphasizes the seminar or working group approach. Classroom
instruction is supplemented by guest lecturers, case
studies, oral and written presentations, and practical
examinations. An additional four hours of individual study
is usually required per day. The school is fully equipped
with modern educational facilities and has a small library
to support individual student research. Students also have
access to the £1 Paso Community Ccllege library and are
encouraged to take advantage of these facilities.
The academy's philosophy is based on the
"whole-man" concept and has as one of its stated benefits
that, "It allows for the close association of professional
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contemporaries in the academic as well as social
environment. This association provides students and their
families the opportunity to exchange ideas and experiences,
thus increasing the educational benefits through personal
communication." The mission of the academy as stated in the
school's information handbook is, "To provide a program of
study to prepare selected noncommissioned officers for
positions of greater responsibility throughout the defense
establishment." A breakdown of training costs per student
is provided in the accompanying table. A listing of courses





US ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY




Of. & MAINT. MTL PERS MAINTENANCE ACT
.
1. Mission , .
a. Instructor
1 98 1964




Student Pay/Allow/ - 9628
















1. Instructor training costs are amortized over a four
year
tour.
2 Student pay/allowances was taken from B-K Dynamics, Inc.,
Billet Coat Model Users Manual , p. D-l, Prepared for the
Bureau of Naval Personnel, PEHS 212. Nov. 1976. Figures
presented represent the full life-cycle cost of an













3. Travel costs based on actual historical cost data and
average student loading per year as provided by
YNC Key, PERS 52, Bureau of Naval Personnel.
Average Family with two Children
a. From East Coast $2000
b. From West Coast $3^00
c. Outside C0NUS $7000
Average number of students from geographic area
a. East Coast 17 per year
b. West Coast 12 per year
c. Non-CONUS 3 per year
Average cost per family per move
a. East 17 x 2000 = 3^.000
b. West 12 x 3^00 = ^0,800
c. 0/Seas
_2 x 7000 = 21.000
32 95.800
Average Travel cost per family
$2,993.75
^. Other costs provided by Capt. Edward J. Wagner, Jr.,
US Army, Controller SMA, Fort Bliss, Texas.
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b. US Air Force Senior NCO Academy
The Air Force Senior NCO Academy is located at
Gunter Air Force Station just outside cf Montgomery,
Alabama. The school was officially activated in July 1972,
and following the rennovation and refurbishing of existing
buildings, classes began in January 1973. Classes consist
of both male and female members of the US Air Force, Air
National Guard, and the Air Force Reserves. The school
graduates five classes a year with 240 students per class.
Existing berthing facilities do not permit expansion of this
class size. The academy faculty consists of both civilian
and military instructors, a large percentage of when; have
university degrees at the baccalaureate level or higher.
The academic day consists of seven hours of classroom
instruction primarily in the form of twelve-man discussion
seminars. Similar to the Army NCO Academy, this course of
instruction is supplemented with guest lecturers, both
military and civilian, case studies, and independent student
research. The academy considers itself unique from the
other Air Force schools in four major ways. First, the
school prcvides professional military education to Senior
Air Force NCC's from all major commands. Second, it has the
capability tc tailor its program specifically to the needs
of the management-level NCO. Third, because of its
nine-week course length, it is able to ccver areas not
explored in shorter courses. Lastly, 36 hours of classroom
time are set aside to permit the student the latitude of
selecting additional instruction, primarily in the
management area. [21] The students are also encouraged to
select current Air Force problems for the topics of their
research papers. The school's facilities are excellent and
should it be needed, the main library of the Air University
at near-by Maxwell Air Force Base is also available.
The academy's philosophy is based on the premise
that the Senior NCO selected to attend the school brings
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with him seme understanding and competence in all areas of
the curriculum. It also assumes that each student knows
himself and his needs and that he desires to play an active
role in his own education. In keeping with this spirit, the
academy presents basic principles and concepts by which the
military operates and encourages each student to identify,
seek out, and obtain the in-depth knowledge he reguires to
improve himself and his ability as a supervisor. The
curriculum emphasizes current Air Force management problems
especially those likely to be encountered by the Senior NCO.
This school, however, stresses the academic approach to
problem solving as opposed to training standardized
responses to routine problems.
In an attempt to further student commitment to
their own improvement, the school does net publish grades
nor rank the students against one another. Rather, each
student takes a battery of pre-tests upon his arrival at the
academy and with the assistance of his faculty advisor,
establishes improvement goals for himself. Periodic
objective tesxs are given to measure his progress. However,
the results are discussed in private with the advisor. The
academy believes this procedure to be a particularly strong
factor in its program and is especially prcud of the close
working relationship that developes between the faculty
advisor and his students.
The academy is accredited by the Southern
Association of Collages and Schools. It is also affiliated
with the Community College of the Air Force (CCAF) which
allows eleven semester hours of credit towards a Career
Education Certificate. The mission of the academy as stated
in the school handbook is, "to conduct a program of
professional military education to prepare selected senior
noncommissioned officers to better fulfill their leadership
and management responsibilities." See Appendix E for the
curriculum and hours of instruction. Costs for this program




US AIR FORCE SENIOR NCO ACADEMY
(course length 9 weeks)
















































1. This figure does not include the cost of base support,
student pay and allowances or instructor training costs.
Assuming the costs for base support and instructor training
would be approximately the same as the Army's Sergeants
Major Academy and using the standard pay and allowances
from the Billet Cost Users Manuel , the average cost per
student per week is recomputed below
t
Previous Cost/Student ^80
Instructor training costs (pro rata) 2,062
Base Support (pro rata) 1»853
Student Pay (9 weeks) 3.939
AVERAGE TOTAL COST/STUDENT $8.33^
AVERAGE COST/STUDENT/WEEK $926
2. Other costs provided by Col. Eugene D. Levy, Commandant,
USAF Senior NCO Academy.
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c. OS Marine Corps Staff NCO Academy
The Marine Corps Staff NCO Academy is located in
Quantico, Virginia. The school was activated in June 1971,
and provides leadership training to Marine Corps
Noncommissioned Officers. Unlike the Army and Air Force
academies, the Marine Corps Academy program is dedicated to
training E-6's vice E-8 f s and E-9 , s. Because of differences
in organizational structure within the Marine Corps, late
career training for E-8's and E-9's is provided at separate
schools and is tied directly to the NCC's professional
specialty. Personnel persuing technical-maintenance
oriented careers are provided in-rate, specialty training to
enable them to become Master Sergeants. Other senior NCO's
who are personnel- administrative specialists are trained to
become First Sergeants.
The course of instruction at the Staff NCO
Academy is six weeks long. Each class consists of
approximately 125 students and the school graduates five
classes a year. Because of the rank of the students and the
type of assignments students are normally sent to, the
curriculum emphasis is different from either the Army cr Air
Force Academies. The objective of the Marine Corps Academy
is to develop within the individual NCO the qualities
required to discharge the duties and responsibilities of a
staff sergeant or gunnery sergeant. Mere emphasis is,
therefore, placed on individual leadership skills and
physical fitness. The 240 hcur course cf instruction
reflects these objectives and spends 60 per cent of its time
on leadership and physical fitness and the remaining 40 per
cent on special military related subjects. A curriculum
syllabus if provided in Appendix F.
The mission of the Academy as presented in the
general information booklet is, "To provide staff NCC's of
demonstrated potential with the requisite education and
leadership training to enhance their professional
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qualifications in preparation for assuming duties of greater
contribution to the Corps." Cost data for operating this




US MARINE CORPS STAFF NCO ACADEMY
(course length 6 weeks)
ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET
DIRECT COST
1. Military Labor (Instr./Staff)
2. Civilian Labor








1. Base Operating Support
2. Educational Center
SUBTOTAL










1. The above cost/student figure does not include travel and
student pay and allowances. Using estimates provided for
travel costs by the Air Force and the Billet Cost Users
Manuel for pay and allowances, this figure is recomputed
below
i
Average Cost/Student (from above) 1,417
Travel (based on Air Force estimate, two way) 175
Pay and Allowances (E-6, 6 weeks) 2.067
TOTAL AVERAGE COST/STUDENT $3.6 59
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3 • Ci v ilian Colleges
To investigate the possibility of using civilian
schools cr colleges to provide the desired training, four
organizations were contacted. The colleges contacted were
the University of San Diego (School of Business
Adminstration) and San Diego State University (College of
Extended Studies-Military Education Programs) . Golden Gate
University and Chapman College were also contacted because
it was known that these schools already provide special
programs tailored to military needs. All parties contacted
expressed an interest in the program and indicated that they
would be willing to formally discuss such a proposal with
the Navy. Based on this research it has been assumed that
other colleges located near large Naval installations would
also be willing to provide similar programs. Their
individual responses are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
a. University of San Diego
Dr. James M. Burns, Dean of the School of
Business, recommended a specialized program designed for
Chief Eetty Cfficers would best fulfill the Navy's needs.
Although the courses would be solidly grounded in academic
disciplines, he felt that the special program would permit
them to be oriented towards Navy problems. To design such a
curriculum he estimated would cost approximately $500,000 to
$600,000. The cost per student for a ten to twelve week
program would then be about $1500 to $2000. Using these
figures and an assumed five year program with 400 students




UNIVERSITY OP SAN DIEGO
(course length 10 weeks)
FULLY-FUNDED NAVY PROGRAM
1. Curriculum Development ($550,000)
Amortized over 2000 students 275
2. Tuition costs/student 1,775
3. Student Pay and Allowances (E-8, 10 weeks) 4.376
TOTAL AVERAGE COST/STUDENT $6.326
AVERAGE COST/STUDENTAEEK $633
NOTES
1. Incidental costs for books and supplies would be paid
for by the student.
2. No travel costs are calculated because it is assumed all
students would be from the local area and that the college
selected would be within easy commuting distance to each
Navy installation.
3» Pay and allowances represent the opportunity costs for
the services lost to the Navy while the Senior Chief
Petty Officer is a full-time student.
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b. San Diego State University (SDSO)
Mr. David J. Hunter, Director of Military
Education Programs responded for San Diego State University.
He stated there were no foreseeable problems implementing
such a program at SDSU for the Navy and that his school
would be very interested in pursuing this proposal on a
formal basis. SDSU is presently a member of the
Serviceman's Opportunity College (SOC) . SOC is an
organization designed to assist the serviceman with his
educational endevors and confers regular and associate
degrees through a variety of special military programs.
Cue to the informal nature of this inquiry, Mr.
Hunter stated exact program costs could net be provided
because information necessary for budget and contract
formulation was not known. However, the average cost per
full-time student for the 1976-1977 school year was reported
to be $3091. This assumes that a full-time student is
enrolled for 15 units of academic credit per semester. Each
semester is 17 weeks long and there are two regular
semesters per year. Using these figures as a standard, the
average cost per student per week would be $91.00.
Eased on Mr. Hunter 1 s assurances that the school
could tailor its regular 17-week curriculum to 10-weeks for
a special Navy program and using the average student cost
per week of $91.00, the cost for this program is calculated




SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY
(course length 10 weeks)
FULLY-FUNDED NAVY PROGRAM
1. Tuition (10 weeks) 910
2. Student Pay and Allowances (E-8, 10 weeks) 4.376
TOTAL AVERAGE COST/STUDENT $5.286
AVERAGE COST/STUDENT/WEEK SS29
REVISED AVERAGE COST/STUDENT/WEEK^ $556
NOTES
1. Curriculum development costs were not included for SDSU.
No figure could be provided unless specific courses were
requested.
2. Incidental expenses for books and school supplies would
be paid for by the student.
3. To facilitate comparisons and to properly recognize the
costs for curriculum development it has been assumed that
curriculum development costs would be approximately the
same as that for the University of San Diego. Using an
average curriculum development cost of $550,000 and
amortizing this cost over 400 students for each of five




c. Chapman College and Golden Gate University
These two schools will be discussed together
because of the similarity of their programs. Although these
schools generally specialize in providing night classes for
military students at various military installations, both
indicated they would be interested in providing a special
program at similar locations for full-time Navy students.
Eecause of the responsive and extremely flexible
programs these schools offer, they have relied on the host
activity to provide or rent all classroom and office space.
They stated this requirement is usually not a major problem
at most large Naval installations. It was noted, however,
that the majority of their courses were only offered at
night when classroom space is more easily available.
Further interviews with the school's
representatives revealed that all operating and overhead
expenses are usually absorbed by the hcst activity and that
incidential school expenses for books and supplies are paid
for by the individual students. This type of operating
policy limits the schools' responsibilities to providing the
instructors and to administering the program.
Eased on the above information, it was
determined that this type of program was primarily oriented
to providing specific instructors for specific courses on a
part-time basis. Although it is acknowledged that these
schools provide a valuable service to the military, it was
determined that they are not presently staffed nor organized
to manage a program of the size being investigated.
Further, the type of program these schccls offer is not
significantly different from alternative three, the college
extension program. Based on these reasons, no further
information was obtained from these schools.
** • College Extension Program
The college extension program is basically the
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military version of "night school". Courses are offered by
more than three hundred and fifty colleges throughout the
country, ccnviently located near most large Naval
activities. Classes usually meet twice a week for three
hours per session with normal class hours 6 to 9pm. The
average course requires 8 to 10 weeks tc complete and
assuming satisfactory performance, provides three
credit-hours of college level work. Students may either be
reguired to attend classes on the schccls campus or if
special arrangements are required, some schcols will send
instructors to a Naval base if a classroom can be provided.
A variety of courses are offered by these colleges and based
on an interview with Ms. Sandra Scott of the Naval Education
and Training Support "enter, Pacific (NETSCPAC) , most
participating colleges would be willing to tailor their
programs to fulfill a Navy need.
The costs per course vary widely depending en the
type of course (college or graduate level, technical or
general) and also between schools. Based en an average of
25 schools randomly selected from the Off Duty Education
Catalog, the average cost for a three-credit course is
approximately $170.00. The Navy usually funds 75 per cent
of this cost or approximately $125.00. The academic load
carried by the average student is one ccurse per period with
an annual average completion rate per student of two to
three courses. (These averages were provided by NETSCPAC
based on a three year average in the San Diego area.)
Assuming the average E-8 enrolled in a special Navy program
would complete the greater number of courses per year, it
would take him approximately three years (9 courses) to
complete a curriculum comparable to that proposed in the
other alternatives. Although this is a significant period
of time, the Navy does not give up the benefit of the man's
services during this time. Therefore, there is no
opportunity or salary costs to be accounted for with this
program. There also are no travel or per diem costs to be
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considered. Lastly, incidential costs for books and school
supplies are paid for by the student.
Assuming the bulk of the courses offered could be
easily modified to fit the Navy's needs, the average costs
for this program are as follows:
Presen
ears No of Courses Cost/Course Total Value
1 3 125 375 375
2 3 125 375 412
3 3 125 375 454
Total Cost/Student 1241
(Assumes a discount rate of 10% and no inflation)
To encourage Senior Chief Petty Officers to make use
of this program, the Navy could fund the entire ccsts of
each course. Using the same calculations as above and a
cost per course of $170, the cost to the Navy per student
would be $1688. It is assumed some type of service
obligation would also be incurred from using this program to
prevent its abuse.
5 • Correspondence Courses
The last alternative investigated was the use of
correspondence courses. Although the costs and versatility
of this alternative appeared desireable, the limitations
imposed on the types of courses that could be adequately
presented and the extremely poor completion rate experienced
with this program, ruled out the possibility cf its use. An
analysis of the completion statistics for this program
indicated that only five per cent of the students who enroll
in a correspondence course ever complete it. [22] In view
of the above, this program was not considered a viable





From an initial comparison of the bottom-line cost
figures of the preceeding alternatives, the college
extension program is obviously the least expensive. Such an
analysis is, however, limited by only having accounted for
those items for which a dollar value can be assigned. A
complete analysis should look at all the costs and benefits,
whether they are quantifiable in economic terms or not. To
arrive at this final decision each training alternative will
be carefully evaluated against the previously identified
effectiveness criteria. To facilitate organizing the
alternatives and criteria, a table has been provided at the
end of this chapter.
Management Skills
The first assumption stated that any of the
alternatives, given sufficient time, funding and effort,
could produce qualified graduates. Implicit in this
assumption is the belief that the quality of instruction
would also be equivalent among alternatives. This assumes
that a qualified graduate from one program would be
comparable to a qualified graduate from any of the ether
programs. Without an after-the-fact, closely-controlled
experiment it would be impossible to realistically test the
validity of this assumption. Therefore rather than
attempting to resolve this dilemma, it will he assumed that
there is no quality difference between programs and all
alternatives will be given credit for adequately providing
the desired management skills.
IfJsctiveness
The effect of the graduates on the Navy's overall
efficency and effectiveness is another criterion that is
impossible to predict. If it can be assumed that trained
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people will perform batter, then given sufficient time it
should be possible to see a general improvement in the
Navy's overall performance. However, it should be noted
that the selection of candidates for any of these programs
will have as much impact on the Navy's goals of improved
efficiency and effectiveness as will the quality cf the
education provided. Recognizing this fact the Navy must
ensure that only the highest quality personnel are selected.
Standardized selection criteria, well publicized and
uniformly applied through a central selection process would
be the best means of consistently meeting this goal. Since
the candidate selection criteria is independent of a
comparison among alternatives and it has previously been
suggested that trained people will perform better which will
cause an overall improvement in the Navy's effectiveness,




With respect to student loading, all alternatives with
exception of the use of other service NCO academies can
accomodate the number of students desired. All existing
service NCC academies are physically limited by both
classroom and living space available. The proposed Navy
school can accomodate the student loading desired. However,
the use of civilian colleges has the added advantage that no
student berthing would be required. This advantage is
possible because the colleges selected could be conviently
located near major Naval installations thereby allowing the




The salaries paid to the students is one cf the largest
factors contributing to the high training costs for all but
the college extension program. If it can be assumed that
the salaries paid to Naval personnel accurately reflect the
cost of services provided, then in an economic analysis the
opportunity cost of the services not provided must be
considered as a cost of the training program.
The college extension program is the only alternative
that does not require the Navy to give up the services of
its personnel while they are in training. However, there
are non-guantifiable costs involved with this alternative
that should be considered. as mentioned earlier, the
college extension program is run at night and normally
requires outside preparation time in addition to the two,
three-hour classes per week. This requirement must be added
to the list of time demands on the Navy student such as duty
nights, deployments, extended working hours, relaxation, and
family time. If opportunity costs must be computed in an
economic analysis, then this cost to the student should also
be considered.
It could be argued, however, that attending night school
while holding down a full-time job is something that is done
by thousands of people every year. This fact can net be
refuted. If it is assumed that there is little difference
between job demands of the Navy and civilian life, then any
man who genuinely desires to improve himself would be
willing to accept this additional cost. The Navy
professional concerned about his performance could be
defined in this last group.
There are also additional costs to be considered fcr two
of the ether alternatives. In the case of the Army
Sergeant's Major Academy the student has only two choices:
(1) he can accept two back-to-back family moves within a
period of six months; or (2) he can leave his family fcr the
period cf training. To the average Senicr Chief Petty
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Officer who has a family with school aged children and who
has already experienced numerous long family separations,
neither of these choices may be desirable.
Although the time period involved is significantly
shorter for a Navy SCPO Academy, the choices available may
be equally undesir eable. If a student desires to bring his
family with him he must do so at his own expense. If he
decided not to bring them with him he would have to leave
them behind at his eld duty station or send them ahead to
the new cne. In either case the disruptive period of the
move may be extended because of this enroute training.
There may also be an additional financial cost tc the
student if it were necessary for him to return to his old
duty station to help his family move. Although there are
many variations and potential complications involved with
providing enroute training during a permanent change of
station (PCS) move, it should be pointed out that this
procedure has been successfully used by the Navy for many
years. Despite the personal inconvience it may cause, there
may not be a better least cost solution for all parties
involved
.
In view of the intent of this criterion which is to
recognize only those programs that minimize the less of
productive time, with its associated high financial cost to
the Navy, the college extension program would have to be
considered as the best alternative meeting these
requirements. However, the above non-quantifiable costs
should still be taken ' into consideration when making a
decision among programs.
H^li§3§5§2l Control
The last criterion considered to be absolutely essential
to any Navy program is the ability of the Navy to directly
exert management control over the program. The reason this
control is seen as essential is not so much to ensure that a
"standard" graduate is produced as it is tc ensure that a
standard curriculum is presented and that the program is
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able to respond quickly tc designed changes. Given these
guidelines it wculd appear that an in-house Navy school
would be the optimal solution. Although programs
established at the other service academies or at civilian
colleges would also have to be at least receptive tc Navy
demands, it is doubtful that any of these alternatives could
be as responsive as a direct Navy chain of command. It also
would be unreasonable to expect the other services to make
majcr changes to their school's curriculums just to satisfy
a Navy need. It would be equally unrealistic to expect the
number of different civilian schools involved through the
other alternatives to be as responsive as one Navy school,
especially if the schools did not agree with the change.
The Navy could drop a civilian school that wculd not agree
to proposed changes, however, this acticn could be very
disruptive to the overall program.
Retention
One of the most critical issues in the Navy today is
retention. This concern for retention has become even more
sensitive with the advent of the all vclunteer force.
Recent statistics released by the Bureau of Naval Personnel
indicated that as of December 1976 the average years of
service for a Master Chief Petty Officer was cnly
twenty-four years and that this average was declining. [23]
This fact appeared even more dismal when compared to the
retention of E-9*s in the other services fcr twenty-seven
years of service. The difference between these figures
seems to indicate that something could be dene to inprove
the Navy's retention efforts for its enlisted middle
managers
.
The historical review presented earlier indicated that
since the inception of the E-8 - E-9 program, this group has
desired challenging billets with increased responsibility
and authority commensurate with their rank and experience.
It was further noted that early attempts to provide more
challenging billets through rating compression failed
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because the E-8 - E-9's were net properly trained to assume
these new positions. Presently there is no way to
accurately forecast the effect formal leadership-management
training would have on job satisfaction and the retention of
E-8 - E-9's. However, based on the retention statistics for
the ether services and recognizing the fact that the Navy is
the only service presently not providing formal late career
training, it could be argued that this training is one of
the factors having a positive effect on the retention of E-8
E-9's in the other services. Informal researcher
interviews cf Senior Chief Petty Officers attending the
Army's Sergeant's Major Academy seemed tc support this
argument. Their statements, however, went on to emphasize
that training is only part of the answer. In addition to
being trained they still desire to be assigned to billets
that would require them to use their training. In general
they felt that providing one without the ether would only
increase their frustrations and cause a negative impact on
their retention.
From the foregoing it appears that it may be impossible
to separately evaluate the effect of training on retention.
Additionally, it would be presumptuous tc predict the
outcome of a future decision of Navy leaders in regard to
the utilization of E-8 - E-9's. Therefore, rather than
attempting to weigh the potential differences between
alternatives and their impact on retention, none of the
alternatives will be given credit for this criterion.
££i^e and Self-Esteem
Many officers feel a sense of pride and increased
self-esteem as a result of their selection to attend post
graduate school or a military college. It is also a
generally accepted belief that selection for one of these
schools is in some way a reward or recognition for
outstanding service. Extending this reasoning to the
enlisted ranks, it could be assumed that Senior Chief Petty
Officers would view their selection and graduation from a
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special Navy program in a similar manner. Inherent in this
assumption is the requirement that this special program be
perceived as being comparable to the officer schools and
therefore desirable to the chief petty officers. It is
unlikely that potential candidates for this training will
presume the Navy does not intend to somehow recover the
costs for its investment. However, this fact makes it no
less gratifying to an individual to realize that the Navy
thinks highly of him and is willing to make a significant
investment in him. Further, the benefits of this perception
may not be limited solely to those selected. If the Senior
Chief Petty Officers selected truly represent the Navy's
best, then ethers who would like to become members of this
special group may make the necessary effort to ensure their
performance would support their selection.
Of the alternatives considered, the college extension
program is the least costly. However, it also appears to
offer the least in terms of public recogniticn. Although a
person could take great personal pride in acquiring this
advanced education at night school while working full-time,
it is doubtful he would feel any special pride in or
allegiance tc the organization that required him to do so on
his own time, albeit paying 75 tc 100 per cent of the costs.
There alsc would be no feeling of pride in being "selected"
since this program is available to everyone. Providing this
training on "company time", however, not enly provides a
welcome break from normal duties but as Frederick Fiedler
stated in his book, A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness,
"it alsc allows the professional a chance tc reflect en his
career, widen his intellectual horizon, and raise his own
morale and that of his subordinates." [24] The first three
alternatives provide this late-career boost and, therefore,
each will be given credit for fulfilling this criterion.
Accredited
The quality of the education provided in this program
should meet at least college level requirements. The only
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program that might not be automatically accredited would be
an in-house Navy school. However, based en the credits
awarded to the other service NCO academies, accrediting a
Navy school should also be possible. All alternatives
therefore have the ability tc meet this criterion.
Supervision
The additional benefits derived by students who are
closely monitored and supervised in the academic environment
have been well documented by other academic institutions.
Additionally, the other service NCO academies boast of their
small student to instructor ratios and imply that they are
able to produce a higher quality graduate because of this
relationship. Once again all alternatives could be designed
to provide a relatively small student to instructor ratio.
However, oecause of the nature of the college extension
program, instructors may not be available to assist students
other than during classes. Additionally, due tc the
part-time aspect of this program, the same instructors may
not even be available from course to course. The benefits
derived from this program, therefore, may be of less value
than frcm the other three. In each of the other
alternatives, the instructors would be available on at least
a daily basis and with the use of a service academy the
instructors would be available throughout the program. Only
these three alternatives will, therefore, be evaluated as
fulfilling this requirement.
Orientation
With the exception of using other service NCO academies,
each of the other alternatives could be developed as a
special Navy program. It is reasonable to assume,
therefore, that the curriculum could be built around Navy
examples. Additionally, it could be expected that each
student would contribute a wealth of personal examples to
expand classroom discussions.
If using another services' NCO academy, it is equally
reasonable tc assume that the classroom examples presented
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would normally be selected from within that service. This
is the current practice at the Army Sergeant's Major Academy
although it was noted that some classroom discussions were
lead by Navy students using Navy examples. Except for these
occasional discussions, the majority of the examples
presented were selected for their appropriateness to Army
problems. It is assumed the same would held true if Navy
students were allowed to attend the Air Force SNCO Academy.
For this reason the use of another service NCO academy will
not be given credit for this criterion.
Immediate Return On Investment
If leadership-management training does provide for
improved performance by the graduates, then the sooner this
improved performance is available and longer period over
which it is provided the better the program should be
considered. Each of the first three alternatives would
produce fully qualified graduates in approximately ten to
twenty-two weeks. The college extension program would
reguire approximately three years. Using this criterion the
first three alternatives would provide improved performance
both earlier and, considering no effect on retention, ever a
longer period of time. This fact must be tempered with the
realization that a person does not have to graduate to
benefit from his training. The college extension program
should provide seme improvement in a Senior Chief Petty
Officer's performance as he completes each course. It is
reasonable tc assume though, that a person whe has completed
the entire program should be better able tc bring the full
advantage of his education to bear on a problem than a
person who has only completed a portion of it. Based on
this assumption the college extension program does not
fulfill this criterion.
Navy Topics
To ensure that Navy middle managers are knowledgeable
and up-to-date on all special Navy management programs and
procedures, late-career training should include time for
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training in these topics. This training is considered vital
for the development of knowledgeable Navy middle managers if
they are to be expected to properly supervise and administer
these programs in the fleet. For ease of coordinaticn it
would be desireable to include this training within the
framework of a special Navy program. However, it would be
possible to provide thsse topics at a separate Navy school
or training center but to do so would be mere burdensome.
The only alternative, therefore, that has the ability to
easily incorporate this training within its program
structure is the Navy SCPO Academy.
A graphic display of the analysis of the subjective
aspects of the Navy leadership-management training
alternatives is provided in the accompanying table. The
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Effectiveness X X X X
Student








Esteem X X X
Accredited X X X X
Supervision X X X
Orientation X X X
R.O.I. X X X
Navy Topics X
Raw Score 10 6 8 6
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v « CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis has focused on the apparent problems with
the Navy's E-8 - E-9 program and has attempted to identify
what these problems are. From the results of the historical
review presented in chapter II it is obvious that this is
not the first investigation of these problems. It also is
evident that despite the numerous recommended solutions
offered during the past nineteen years, the basic problems
have not significantly changed. Since the beginning of this
program, Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers have been
promised new, different and challenging billets. To their
frustration they have continued to be assigned and utilized
as ordinary chief petty officers with almost no regard for
their senior ranking. This problem continues today and has
been reported to the Navy's leadership as recently as August
1977, by the Pers 23 study group. [25]
Since the signing of Public Law 85-422 in 1958, Senior
and Master Chief Petty Officers have been caught between the
technical responsibilities assigned to E-7's and the
managerial responsibilities assigned -co Warrant and Limited
Duty Officers. To add to their percieved sense of "not
belonging", they have been defined by the Navy's leadership
as middle managers but have been assigned and treated at the
working level as senior technicans. The results of these
actions can be used to explain at least partially the low
retention rates for Navy E-8 - E-9's and for the percieved
loss of prestige by the group once called the "the backbone
of the Navy". What makes this issue particularly disturbing
is that the problems have been identified and reported
continuously for almost twenty years. Throughout this time
the Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers have continued to
ask for challenging assignments that are commensurate with
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their experience and seniority and that provide for
increased authority and responsibility. In more recent
years they have also asked for additional training to tetter
prepare themselves for these assignments.
The need to improve the capabilities of the Navy's
middle managers has also been recognized by Navy leaders at
various levels in the chain of command. An example tc this
concern was expressed in a letter in 1971, from the
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet to the Chief of
Naval Personnel in which he stated, "We have failed up to
now -to provide formal leadership training and guidance for
our petty officers and as a result expect too much from
on-the-job training. The leadership gap at the middle
management level requires closing and this school (CPO
Academy) would be the best way to get off the ground." [26]
Over the years the Navy's response to this percieved
need has been the development of 157 various leadership
courses or course sequences which are offered at 139
training locations. [27] The predominate emphasis of these
courses is on organizational function and leadership styles
with little attention being paid to the areas of human
behavior and human resource management. The average cost
for providing these leadership courses was reported by the
Director of Leadership Training at the Naval Amphibious
School in Coronado, California, to be three hundred dcllars
for a two-week course. This cost, however, dees not include
student pay and allowances, travel or per diem. If is is
assumed that most students sent to this and the other major
training commands are from the surrounding areas and are not
paid travel or per diem, then the only additional costs to
be considered are for pay and allowances. Dsing the average
two-weeK cost for an S-8, this brings the total cost of this
training to $1176 per student. Although a study conducted
by the CNET staff in 1975, could not state definitively that
this training is ineffective in meeting fleet needs, it
would appear that based on the information presented in this
72

thesis and the continued expressed concern of Navy leaders
that it is net. If this assumption is correct, then one
must decide which type of training program would be better.
This thesis has presented five alternative methods of
providing the Navy's middle managers with
leadership-management training and the costs involved with
each. It also has proposed criteria for assessing the cost
effectiveness of the alternatives and pointed out some of
the non-guantifiable factors that should be taken into
consideration.
Correspondence courses were eliminated as as alterr.ative
because with only a 5 per cent completion rate it is not an
effective training system at any cost. Based on the number
of students recommended to participate in this program, the
use of the other services' NCO academies is also not
feasible. The Air Force NCO Academy does not have any extra
room for Navy students. The Army Sergeants Major Academy
does not have sufficient room for a Navy program even if the
student enrollment was enlarged to its full capacity of 240
students per class. Lastly, the Marine Corps Staff NCO
Academy does not provide the desired curriculum nor is it
geared to the desired student rank. Therefore, of the
alternatives originally proposed only the extension program,
the full-time use of civilian colleges, and the in-hcuse
Senior Chief Petty Officer Academy remain. The raw scores
of these alternatives as measured against the prepesed
criteria are 6, 8, and 10 respectively. The costs ranged
from $1700 to $10,020.
One of the principal objectives of the Pers 23 study
group was to "evolve a larger role and greater prestige" for
Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers. If the Navy is
genuinely concerned about the prestige and self-esteem of
its middle managers, then it is suggested that requiring
this group to attend night school on their own time will add
little to these perceptions. It is also noted that this
alternative is already available to the Navy's middle
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managers and yet for a number of undetermined reasons it is
not extensively used. It is, therefore, doubted that iraking
it a Navy policy that all Senior and Master Chief Petty
Officers should attend night school tc improve their
managerial abilities will have much effect on the current
attendance rate. In addition, since there would be no way
to control who attended this program there would likely be
no special sinse of pride in being selected by the Navy nor
any special allegiance felt towards the Navy as a result of
attending this program. Lastly, the estimated duration of
this program would tend to be an obstacle tc completing the
training during one normal duty assignment. It would also
be almost impossible to use this program during an
operational sea tour. For these reasons this alternative
will be eliminated from further consideration.
Of the two alternatives remaining, the only major
differences noted by this researcher were in the areas of
management control and the ability to present Navy topics.
There may also be some variation in the sense of pride
percieved in attending a civilian school over a Navy school
but this perception may also vary in the opposite direction
or even between two civilian schools. Ihis perception
variance is net believed to be a significant factor and will
not be considered.
If the Navy were to select one civilian college
conviently located near each major Naval installation, it is
probable that there would be at least six colleges involved
with this alternative. Although each school would probably
require some type of laision-administrative support, the
cost of this support should not be significact and could be
absorbed by the host activity. The ease with which the Navy
could implement desired course changes, however, may be
significant, especially if the colleges involved did not go
along with the Navy recommendations. These changes could
also involve additional costs for curriculum development or
instructor training at each school. Since it is impossible
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to measure the costs of these changes cr to predict the
frequency with which they might occur, the last criterion
will now be investigated to determine if it might resolve
this final decision point.
Since Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers are
responsibile for managing the various Navy programs, it
would be advantageous to update their knowledge of these
programs at the same time as they recieve their other
late-career training. Topics included under this heading
would be unique to the Navy organization and would be best
taught by Navy instructors. As mentioned earlier, it would
be possible to provide this training at a Navy training
command following completion of a program at a civilian
college. However, to do so would involve additional cost
and would be less convenient than incorporating the training
into one program such as at a Navy SCPO Academy.
Based on an average of the time spent at the Any and
Air Force NCC Academies devoted to presenting these topics,
it has been assumed that it would take approximately two
weeks to cover the same material at a Navy training command.
If it is assumed that there is no cost difference for
in-house, classroom training because of the subject matter,
then it can be computed that it would cost approximately
$300 per student for this additional training. Adding again
the cost of an average E-8 for two weeks, this brings the
total additional cost to $1176 per student. A comparison of
the total cost per student for these two programs then shows
the civilian college program to cost approximately $7176 and
the Navy SCEO Academy to cost $10,020. It should be noted,
however, that the Navy school costs have been estimated to
be approximately $80 more per student per week than either
the Army or Air Force NCO academies. Recognizing that the
Navy's estimate contains a degree of error and assuming that
an average of the histcric costs of the other two academies
is likely to be a more accurate prediction of what a similar
Navy school would cost, the revised total cost per student
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for a Navy SCPO Academy would be nearer $9200. Thus, the
final bottom-line financial difference now appears to be
about $2024 per student.
The only differences left to consider are the inherent
advantages of each alternative. The use of civilian schools
offers the following advantages: (1) reduced capital
investment; (2) an ability to be easily dissolved should the
program prove unsatisfactory; and (3) less annual operating
costs. A Navy school offers: (1) the appeal of a unique
Navy school and its potential ability to attract proiinent
guest speakers from the civilian and military communities
which would complement its training program; (2) the close
association of professionals in both the academic and social
enviornment that provides more opportunity fcr the exchange
of thoughts and ideas which may enhance the educational
process; and (3) the increased empathy between student and
instructor as dedicated professionals in the same
organization who are attempting to meet the challenges of a
modern Navy. These last three points were considered to be
extremely important by the commandants of both the Army and
Air Force NCO academies.
The end result of this analysis is the realization that
the final decision between these two alternatives cannot be
made solely on the basis of a difference in dollar costs.
Rather this decision becomes a subjective evaluation of the
dollar value of the intangible benefits accrued to each
alternative. With this realization in mind it is believed
that the inherent advantages of a Navy schocl do outweigh
this cost difference and it is recommended that the Navy




LDO AND WO R3LE AND FUNCTION DEFINITIONS
Limited Duty Officers and Warrant Officers must be
familiar with the organization and functions cf the various
components of the Department of Defense, with particular
reference to the assigned missions of the military services;
organization and function of the Department of the Navy,
including fleet and force commands; contents and scope of 0.
S. Navy Regulations, Information Security Program Regulation
(DOD 5200. 1R), Department of the Navy Supplement to the DOD
Information Security Program Regulation (CPNAVINST 5520.1
series). Uniform Code cf Military Justice (JAGINST 5800.8
series) , Manual for Courts-Martial, and the Manual cf the
Judge Advocate General (JAGINST 5800.7 series) ; procedures
for preparing, revising, and applying a watch, quarter and
station bill and battle bill; Navy enlisted manpower and
personnel classification standard systems; scope and use of
Naval messages, letters and directives; methods and
procedures for disaster control, and nuclear, biological,
and chemical warfare defense; emergency firstaid procedures
and techniques; conduct of personnel, material, and safety
inspections; welfare, agencies and services available to
enlisted personnel. The foregoing should not be construed
as a detailed listing of all the specific duties,
responsibilities, and knowledge which may be required cf the
Limited Duty Officer or Warrant Officer. Watchstanding
duties, collateral, and additional duty assignments, which
are a command perrogative, vary according to the specific
requirements of individual ships and stations. Even thcugn
qualifications pertaining to these duties have not been
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included, Limited Duty and Warrant Officers are responsible




E-7, E-8, E-9 ROLE AND FUNCTION DEFINITIONS
A. CHIEE PETTY OFFICER <E-7>
The Chief Petty Officer is the top technical authority
and expert within a rating. The Chief Petty Officer is
capable of accomplishing all tasks normal to a rating and
uses technical expertise in accomplishing these tasks. The
Chief Petty Officer provides the direct supervision,
instruction and training of lower rated personnel.
B. SENIOR CHIEF PETTY OFFICER <E-8>
The senior technical supervisor within a rating or
occupational field with primary responsibility of
supervision and training of enlisted personnel oriented upon
system and subsystem maintenance, repair and operation.
Eased upon wide ranging experience and specialized training,
the Senior Chief Petty Officer should provide the command
with technical expertise and, dependent upon command
manning, could be expected to perform in the role of a
Master Chief Petty Officer in terms of administrative and
managerial responsibility.
C. MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER <E-9>
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The senior enlisted Petty Officer in the United States
Navy and as such is vested with special command trust and
confidence extending to the administration and management
function involving enlisted personnel. Based upon
experience, proven performance and technical knowledge
necessary to the achievement of Master Chief Petty Officer,
individuals of that rate within a command will hold
commensurate positions and should be expected to contribute
in matters of policy formulaticn as well as implementation
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Physical Training and Appearance Program
SUBTOTAL




































SOURCE 1 Program of Instruction for US Army Sergeants Major





UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
SENIOR NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER ACADEMY
Curriculum
CURRICULUM HOURS
AREA It Communication Skills 34
AREA Hi Environment 44
Phase 1 - The USAF and National
Security Objectives 28
Phase 2 - The USAF Role in Force
Application 16
AREA III: Management 114
Phase 1 - Individuals and the Work
Environment 33
Phase 2 - Management of Human Resourses 30




TOTAL ACADEMIC INSTRUCTION 2J1





TOTAL - Other Than Academic Instruction 123
TOTAL CURRICULUM HOURS 160





UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
STAFF NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER ACADEMY
Curriculum
CURRICULUM HOURS
1. Personnel and General Administration 17
2. Physical Training Management 26
3. Military Justice 8
^. Drill, Customs and Courtesies, and Inspections 26




7. Marine Corps Organization and Staff Functioning 9
8. Leadership 58
TOTAL 171
Testing and Evaluation *H
Administrative 28
TOTAL 2^0
SOURCE i Student Information For Staff NCO Academy , p. 6,




1. Bureau of Naval Personnel, Unclassified Memorandum
Pers-od:RJW to Vice Chief of Naval Operations, CNOJ.S




report cut of topics,
18 October 1976.
2. Dennis, L. V., Ltcol. USAF, Classification and
Utilization of Senior Noncommissioned Offic ers, p. 8,
Air University Report, Air War College Maxwell AFB,
Alabama, April 1976.
3- United States Statutes at Large , 1st ed. , Vol 72 part
1, p. . 124, United States Government Erinting Office,
1959.
4. Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy,
Unclassified letter JAG: 131.9: JMH, serial 10907 to
Chief of Naval Personnel, Limitations Placed on
Utilization of Enlisted Men by_ Law, 30 November 1967.
5. Department of the Navy, Chief Naval Air Training
Instruction 1510.7G, Unclassified, Naval Air Training
Command Chief Petty Officer Academy, 10 November 19 69.
6. Bureau of Naval Personnel, Unclassified Memorandum
Pers-od:RJW to Vice Chief of Naval Operations, CNO 's
MCPO Advisory Panel iOct 1976) ; report cut of t epics,
18 October 1976.
7. Chief of Naval Education and Training, Syst em Design




8. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Ser
01 P/ 1974 34, Draft Lea dership and Management Education
and Training Na^l Training Plan 1LMET NTP) , p. 1-11,
Unclassified, 6 June 1977.
9. Chief of Naval Personnel (Pers 622), Interim Report,
Commissioned and Enlisted Naval Officer Leadership and
MSJlS^ment Characteris tics , McBer and Company, p. 3,
Undated
.







12. U. S. Army Administrative Center, Monograph # 8, A
M^rix of Organizational Leadership Dimensions, by
Stephen D. Clements and Donna B. Ayres, p. ix.
Unclassified, October 1976.
13. Ibid., p. 4.
14. Ibid., p. 14.
15. Ibid., p. 13.
16. Bureau of Naval Personnel (Pers 23), Biefing to
Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, Master/Senior Chief
Petty Officer Reclassification , p. 1, Unclassified,
August 1977.
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